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ABSTRACT
The rapid expansion of the biosciences has led many to turn to nature in
search of genetic resources of commercial value. Bioprospecting, or the search for
plants and animals from which commercially valuable compounds can be obtained,
is often a transnational activity. Four-fifths of the world’s biodiversity is found in
developing countries, and those searching to exploit the biodiversity of these
nations overwhelmingly tend to come from developed, wealthy countries. This
asymmetry, when coupled with the lack of institutional legislative frameworks and
regulation, creates a plethora of user/host conflicts. This paper seeks to examine the
current state of affairs regarding environmental law in Madagascar as it relates to
management of bioprospecting and genetic resource use conflicts. Firstly, it will
examine international and domestic environmental law – with an emphasis on the
recently ratified Convention on Biodiversity and the Nagoya Protocol. Secondly,
non-governmental contractual agreements between local and foreign entities will be
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examined, with an emphasis on the International Cooperative Biodiversity Group as
a case study. The study will conclude with suggestions, warnings, and potential
future research opportunities.

INTRODUCTION
Madagascar is a highly diverse island nation located off the coast of Africa in
the Indian Ocean. Madagascar broke off from the mainland Africa 165 million years
ago, and from India 70 million years ago. Since then, it has followed a relatively
isolated evolutionary path resulting in one of the most unique ecosystems on earth.
Madagascar is host to 12,000 species of vascular plants (96% endemic). Over 90%
of all its wildlife is found nowhere else on earth, and 5% of all of earth’s biodiversity
is found on Madagascar (Madagascar – Country Profile).
Harnessing Madagascar’s biodiversity has been an invaluable tool in
ensuring the prosperity and livelihood of its people. Madagascar’s rich ecosystems
provide food, medicine, construction tools, and energy. An estimated 18 million
people depend on biodiversity in Madagascar for their subsistence needs, and at
least 70% of the population depends on agriculture (Madagascar – Country Profile).
Just as Madagascar’s biodiversity has sustained life for its people, it has also
attracted considerable foreign interest, particularly from those wishing to utilise
and exploit Madagascar’s biodiversity – namely, bioprospectors.
Bioprospecting has played a critical role in how humans interact and use the
nature that surrounds us for centuries. It is how we discover what is edible, what is
medicinal, what can be grown and what should be avoided. Yet the rapid recent
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growth of the biosciences and the commercialisation of nature has morphed
bioprospecting into its current form. Elsa Tsioumani defines it as, “the search for
plants and animals from which commercially valuable compounds can be obtained.
(Tsioumani, 2015)” It occurs across several sectors such as agriculture, cosmetics,
energy, and medicine, and in ecosystems ranging from forests to marine. When done
carefully and properly, bioprospecting has the potential to produce results
beneficial to humankind.
In the food and agriculture sector, plants and food sources shown to be
drought resistant, flood resistant, and pest resistant have contributed considerably
to the genetically modified food industry. In turn, these discoveries have paved the
way for increased food security – and sovereignty – in countries that are the most
affected by climate change, poverty, and hunger (Duraisamy, 2011).
The cosmetics industry constantly has to respond to the vast market demand
on beauty and personal hygiene products. Consumers – and thus suppliers – are
constantly searching for anti-aging, anti-acne, anti-dandruff, and skin whitening
formulas, in addition to the basic colouring products of lipstick and eye shadow.
Bioprospecting enables them to keep up with that demand through discovery of
useful compounds found in nature. For example, many skin-whitening products find
their active molecules in liquorice extracts, mulberry, and aloe (Duraisamy, 2011).
It is the pharmaceutical industry that invests the greatest amount of
resources in bioprospecting. Plants are humans’ original source of healthcare, and
the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that even with the development of
occidental medicine, “approximately 80% of the global population rely
5

predominantly on traditional [plant-based] medicines as their primary source of
health care.” This is true in Madagascar, and approximately one million tonnes of
medicinal plants are exported each year at a value of $3.59 million (Madagascar –
Country Profile).
Outcomes of bioprospecting have the potential to save lives, cure diseases,
and pave the way for new scientific discoveries and insights. Yet in the absence of a
national regulatory framework, bioprospecting in Madagascar has resulted in
conflicts over resources. Implementation of this framework is of paramount
importance for the continued development of Madagascar. This paper will discuss
various case studies of conflicts that have arisen as a result of bioprospecting in
Madagascar, followed by the international, domestic, and non-governmental
attempts to control and manage the sustainable use and mutual benefit of
Madagascar’s genetic resources.

METHODS
This study was conducted from the 5th to the 28th of November 2015.
Informational sources include a collection of both primary and secondary sources.
Primary information was gathered through a series of interviews conducted at the
offices of those being interviewed. Interviews took place primarily in English,
though some were conducted in French or Malagasy with the assistance of a
translator. Prior informed consent was granted for utilisation of information
obtained during the interview.
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Secondary sources come from a range of available academic literature
regarding environmental law, bioprospecting in Madagascar, and various
international treaties and conventions.
No raw data was collected from field surveys or otherwise.

GENETIC RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS IN MADAGASCAR
With nature providing the obvious source of potential compounds, the next
question then becomes how to go about searching for these compounds. With hosts
ranging from plants and marine organisms to microbes and fungi, scientists must
figure out a way to effectively and efficiently narrow down the hundreds of
thousands of potential species to be evaluated.
The five primary selection and screening techniques are random,
taxonomically guided, eco-rational, ethnobotanical, and zoopharmacognosy (Table
1). Random collection is most often used to gather large amounts of data and
establish population baselines, surveys, and botanical diversity counts. They are
rarely effective as a primary means of compound discovery, as they tend to be far
too broad (Miller, J.S., 2005).
Taxonomically guided screening uses families or genera of presumed
chemical interest to direct research. Eco-rational and zoopharmacognosy methods
involve observing animal or ecological species interactions for behaviour or
characteristics. An example of this comes from observation of the sea sponge.
Cancer research institutes have long been searching for compounds that break
down or stop cell growth. Rapid, uncontrollable cell replication causes the growth of
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tumours, and scientists have long been searching for a compound that, when
targeted, can stop or slow the replication of cells and break down existing ones. It
was through an observation of the defence mechanisms of the sea sponge that its
potential was revealed (Richmond, Lecture 15/10/2015).

The sea sponge is an immobile marine invertebrate usually found in coral
reefs with high sunlight. Due to its immobility, the sea sponge has had to develop
defence mechanisms that protect it against coral that often grows over the sponge,
thus blocking its access to light and starving it. To protect against this, when the sea
sponge senses coral intruding on its territory, it releases chemicals that break down
the corals calcium carbonate skeleton, and prevent it from continued growth
(Richmond Lecture, 15/10/2014).
It was through observation of this defence mechanism that scientists began
to investigate further the anti-cancer potentials of sea sponges. A Caribbean sponge
has been discovered to generate compounds used in AZT (zidovudine, Retrovir),
which is used to fight the AIDS virus (Sandhu, H.S., 2006).
While these techniques of bioprospecting provide the fewest social conflicts
with local populations, they can often lead to overexploitation of endemic flora,
8

fauna, and fungi. This happened in Madagascar, Cameroon, and several other African
nations with the case of the African Cherry, or Prunus africana. The P. africana is a
secondary forest canopy tree species whose overexploitation has resulted in severe
Afromontane deforestation. Extracts from the bark began to be used to treat
prostatic hyperplasia, and the trade was worth approximately $220 million in the
1990s. The high demand for the bark on European markets led to the annual
collection of 3300 tonnes of bark annually (Bodeker, G., 2014).
Improper collection techniques and a high demand ultimately resulted in the
once common species being included in Appendix II of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) of Wild Flora and Fauna at the
Ninth CITES Conference of the Parties in 1995. As Bodeker notes, “Overexploitation
of P. africana has occurred in the absence of legally binding treaties, the historic
neglect of customary ownership issues, the disregard for the rights of traditional
knowledge holders, and the complicity of governments in allowing unsustainable
trade, attributed by some commentators to endemic corruption within the
concerned governments.” (Bodeker, G., 2014).
Finally, ethnobotanical bioprospecting involves using local or traditional
knowledge about plant uses to guide surveys and testing. Yet it is another grey area
that has led to several conflicts between users and providers of genetic resources
(Miller, J.S., 2005).
There are currently 2,300 plants used for medicinal purposes in Madagascar,
and traditional healers, as the possessors of that knowledge, have never constituted
a threat to the conservation of biodiversity (Madagascar – Country Profile). Despite
9

pre and post colonial-era stigmatisations and the legal oppression of traditional
healers, including its official prohibition until 2007, Malagasy healers have often
been very open about sharing their knowledge of plants (Ratsimbason, Interview
11/11/15).
Yet the improper use of traditional knowledge (TK) has resulted in cases of
biopiracy, in which TK is exploited for commercial gain with no compensation to the
indigenous people themselves (Shiva, 1997). Perhaps one of the most famous and
oldest cases of biopiracy is that of the Catharantus roseus, or the rosy periwinkle,
which dates to the 1960s. The plant, while native to Madagascar, has been widely
introduced to other tropical countries around the world. Researchers obtained TK
from communities in Jamaica regarding its efficacy as a cure for diabetes. Yet the
introduction into other countries created a transnational situation in which
different countries are reported as having different beliefs about the uses of the
plant (Quansah, N., pers. comm. 3/12/2015). The transnational nature of the plant
meant that researchers could obtain knowledge in one country, and cultivate the
plant in another one. This further complicates claims of who, or which community,
deserves compensation and for what (Shiva, 1997).
Research by the Western pharmaceutical company, Eli Lilly, revealed
alternate uses from the traditional ones. Importantly, the Hodgkin’s Lymphoma
chemotherapy drugs vinblastine and vincristine (for childhood leukaemia) were
derived from the rosy periwinkle. Development of these drugs has resulted in $100
million net profit annually for Eli Lilly, though no benefits (monetary or otherwise)
have been given to source communities. This conflict of benefit sharing is at the
10

heart of modern legal discourse surrounding the use of genetic resources .
(Quansah, N., pers. comm. 3/12/2015).
The Malagasy government has also come in conflict with the non-profit
sector. The NGO l’Homme et l’Environnement recently partnered with the UNEP
World Conservation Monitoring Centre and Chanel Parfums Beauté. They developed
the book “Inventaire des Plantes Médicinales de Vohimana Madagascar,” which
outlines the plants of Vohimana and their traditional medicinal uses. The Office
National pour l’Environnement (ONE) was unhappy with this publication for two
reasons. Firstly, the process was carried out without the consent of the Malagasy
government. Secondly, the publication of this traditional knowledge places it in the
public domain with l’Homme et l’Environnement as the technical owners of this
information, making it much more difficult to protect (Raharimalala, V., Interview,
26/11/2015).
The improper use of traditional knowledge raises further the issue of prior
informed consent (PIC). PIC is defined as “assent to permit an occurrence that is
based on a complete disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently, such
as knowledge of the risks entailed or alternatives” (West’s Encyclopaedia of American
Law, 2008). PIC does not only apply to the use of TK, but also grants organisations
wishing to bioprospect access to the communities’ resources.
In the absence of a national regulatory framework outlining the
requirements for PIC, the onus lies on companies to obtain PIC. Yet what this often
means is that with nothing to check companies, PIC is either not obtained, obtained
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through dishonest or obscure means, or it is obtained, but not from a figure with the
authority to give consent (Shiva, 1997).
Finally, international patenting laws were created primarily by and for
industrialised countries. General rules are that a product to be patented must be
new, novel, and it cannot be in its naturally occurring form. In the pharmaceutical
sector, this generally means that you can use a plant for medicine and patent it, but
only the isolated active molecule responsible for the medicinal purposes is patented
(no longer in its naturally occurring form) (World Trade Organisation, 2006).
The process of isolating an active molecule is a lengthy, difficult, and costly
process that involves equipment most research organisations in Madagascar do not
have access to. So, instead, Malagasy pharmaceutical companies and research
centres like IMRA, CNARP, and SOTRAMEX often settle for isolating the compound
as an essential oil, putting it in pill form, and patenting the whole pill. The active
molecule is in the pill – they just do not have a precise chemical formula for it.
What this means is that under international patent law, the Malagasy
company has a patent on the pill as a whole. So, if a foreign company were to take
that exact pill and manage to isolate the active molecule within it (or take it out of its
naturally occurring form by isolating or synthesising it) and then develop a drug
that makes millions, it is a perfectly legal loophole that cheats and excludes
Madagascar out of their profits (Ratsimbason Interview, 11/11/2015).
With so many conflicts arising out of the use of genetic resources, legislation
must be comprehensive and broad to ensure adequate access, use, and benefit
sharing for both user and provider countries.
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LEGALLY BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
THEIR DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the Bonn Guidelines
Discussions regarding genetic resources have been on the international
agenda since the 1990s. In 1992 the United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development led to a record 157 signatories to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and its ratification in December 1993. The CBD paved the way for
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and the legal backbone of
international environmental governance (McGraw, D., 2002).
Article 1 of the CBD outlines its three main goals; conservation of
biodiversity, sustainable use of resources, and equitable sharing of benefits derived
from the use of genetic resources. It is the final goal that makes the CBD so
revolutionary, and reflects the bargaining power held by developing countries as the
collective owners of four-fifths of the world’s biodiversity (McGraw, D., 2002). These
biologically rich countries, like Madagascar, felt they were not receiving adequate
compensation from high yielding pharmaceuticals and cosmetics whose core
elements come from their territories. They argued that this asymmetrical economic
benefit system reduced the incentive to conserve. Thus, the ability to include the
equitable sharing of benefits as an objective of the CBD was an important step in
recalibrating the incentives for biodiversity conservation.
Articles 15, 16, 19, and 18(j) cover access and benefit sharing (ABS)
provisions in the CBD. Article 15 of the CBD addresses the terms and conditions for
access to genetic resources by outlining the basic principles it should uphold.
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Importantly, it recognises the sovereignty of States over their natural resources.
This places the government as custodian, and in the position to grant or deny access
subject to the prior informed consent (PIC) of the contracting party providing such
resources. Terms of access shall be “based on mutually agreed upon terms (MAT) in
order to ensure the sharing of benefits arising from the commercial or other
utilization of these genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such
resources (CBD, 2001)”
Furthermore, the CBD includes compliance and enforcement provisions.
Article 18.3 was responsible for the establishment of a Clearing House Mechanism
(CHM), which was implemented after Conference of the Parties to the Convention
(COP) 10 Decision X/15. The Clearing Houses’ main goals include promoting
information sharing to facilitate the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol and
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, a network of CHMs, and the
establishment of a national focal point for the CHM (CBD Website).
Madagascar was signatory to this convention on 8 June 1992, and ratified the
convention on 4 March 1996, under the Presidency of Albert Zafy. Like many other
countries, this treaty provided Madagascar with the legal backing to demand
compensation for, and regulate the use of, its genetic resources. Many in the country
greeted the CBD with open arms (Ramiandrarivo, L., Interview, 17/11/2015).
Although the CBD entered into force at the end of 1993, and despite it being a
legally binding document, few countries had developed domestic legislation in an
attempt to comply with CBD principles, and even fewer were enforcing that
legislation. Furthermore, those countries who did have the legal capacity to
14

translate CBD provisions into ABS law tended to be industrialised countries with
advanced biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries – those with both a
heightened interest in access to resources and little desire to engage in benefit
sharing. It seemed that the victory developing countries had achieved in ensuring
Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) provisions in the CBD was purely nominal
(Morgera, E., 2012).
Madagascar, continuing down its own path as a fledgling democracy with a
weak central government, was not in a position to draft, approve, or enforce ABS
legislation. Madagascar continued to face issues regarding access and use of genetic
resources, as previously indicated with the cases of the Prunus Africana and the
Rosy Periwinkle.
It was not until 1999 that attempts to operationalize the ABS provisions of
the CBD began. Work began on drafting the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising Out of Their
Utilisation.
The first draft of the Bonn Guidelines was presented in October 2001, and
eventually adopted with some changes during COP 6, in April 2002. Though the
guidelines are not legally binding, their unanimous adoption by some 180 countries
gives them clear and indisputable authority. As stated in the introduction to the
Bonn Guidelines, written by Executive Secretary Hamdallah Zedan:
The Guidelines identify the steps in the access and benefitsharing process, with an emphasis on the obligation for users to
seek the prior informed consent of providers. They also identify
the basic requirements for mutually agreed terms and define
the main roles and responsibilities of users and providers and
stress the importance of the involvement of all stakeholders.
15

They also cover other elements such as incentives,
accountability, means for verification and dispute settlement.
Finally, they enumerate suggested elements for inclusion in
material transfer agreements and provide an indicative list of
both monetary and non-monetary benefits.
The suggested elements for inclusion in material transfer agreements and list
of monetary and non-monetary benefits have been included as Appendices A and B
respectively.
The Bonn Guidelines operated under the assumption that all countries are
both users and providers of genetic resources. As such, countries were expected to
adopt “both source-country measures, including provisions clarifying each country’s
sovereign rights over genetic resources, and the identification of access procedures
and requirements; and user-country measures, by which each country addresses the
responsibility of users under its jurisdiction who are utilising genetic resources
from other countries. (Morgera, E., 2012)”
Similar to the CBD, little progress was made by Parties to actualise ABS
legislation following the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines. It was, after all, a nonbinding document. Nevertheless, four months later, in August 2002, the World
Summit on Sustainable Development triggered the negotiations that led to the
development of the Nagoya Protocol.

Nagoya Protocol
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising Out of Their Utilisation to the Convention on
Biological Diversity is the culmination of almost two decades of discussion and
negotiation regarding ABS. It entered into force on 12 October 2014 after being
16

ratified by 54 countries – including Madagascar. It provides a much more thorough,
and legally binding alternative to the Bonn Guidelines. Madagascar is currently in
the process of implementation.
It is hoped that the Nagoya Protocol will leverage the interests of all
stakeholders in a way that results in mutually beneficial arrangements. Benefit
sharing agreements will incentivise provider countries to make their genetic
resources accessible. On the other hand, enhancing researchers’ access based on
reliable decisions at low transaction costs will encourage scientific breakthroughs
and the innovation of useful goods and services whilst promoting country
development (Morgera, E., 2012).
This section assesses what Madagascar’s obligations as Party to the Protocol
are, the trans-sectorial legal implications of the Nagoya Protocol, and the
implementation process and challenges Madagascar faces going forward.
Madagascar’s Obligations as Party to the Protocol
Though many criticised the document as inadequate (COP 10, pg. 98 – 102) –
including Madagascar and the African Group – major steps were taken in setting
precedents for access, institutional obligations, and benefit-sharing mechanisms.
First, the Nagoya protocol outlined and defined several key terms and
concepts that had otherwise been left amorphous. Article 2.c states “utilisation of
genetic resources” to mean, “to conduct research and development on the genetic
and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources, including through the
application of biotechnology.” It defines in Article 2.d biotechnology as “any
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivates
17

thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.” Finally, it defines
“derivates” in Article 2.e as “a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting
from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if
it does not contain functional units of heredity.”
Definition of these terms is of paramount importance, as it sets the precedent
and scope for what may or may not be under the jurisdiction of the Protocol.
Secondly, in Articles 6, 7, and 12, issues regarding access to genetic resources
and the traditional or indigenous knowledge associated with said resources are
addressed. Madagascar is responsible under Article 6 to take steps to establish:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Legal certainty, clarity, transparency, and timeliness;
Fair and non-arbitrary access rules and procedures;
Information on how to apply for PIC;
Clear and transparent written decision by a competent national
authority, in a cost effective manner and within a reasonable period of
time; and
5. Issuance of a permit or its equivalent at the time of access as evidence of
PIC and the establishment of mutually agreed upon terms (MAT).
Similar to the Bonn Guidelines, the Protocol operates off the assumption that
all countries are both user and provider countries. As such, administrative
procedures for obtaining prior informed consent and establishing rules of access are
the same for both foreign and domestic entities seeking access rights.
Madagascar’s government must provide the necessary institutional
arrangements to ensure the accessibility of its genetic resources, and to develop
domestic regulations regarding the parameters of benefit sharing, as stated in
Article 15 (Compliance with Domestic Legislation or Regulatory Requirements on
Access and Benefit Sharing), and Article 16 (Compliance with Domestic Legislation
or Regulatory Requirements on Access and Benefit Sharing for Traditional
18

Knowledge Associated with Genetic Resources). Furthermore, precise terms and
arrangements for the process and activation of ABS are to be arranged among
relevant parties in the development of MAT.
Benefits shared may be monetary (in the form of access fees, milestone
payments, royalty payments, or research funding), or non-monetary (in the form of
information sharing, product development participation, technology transfers, or
institutional capacity building projects). Benefits are encouraged to promote the
first two goals of the CBD, conservation and sustainable use. See Appendix A for the
full list of suggested monetary and non-monetary benefits under the Nagoya
Protocol.
On a more broad level, Article 21 stresses the importance of awareness
raising projects to be done. These include the establishment of local or indigenous
committees (21.b), dissemination of information through a national clearing-house
(21.d), and the education and training of users, providers, and relevant stakeholders
during the negotiation and implementation process (21.g). In Madagascar, the
National Educational Policy Related to the Environment enforces this through close
collaboration between the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research and the
Ministry in charge of Environment and Forests (Madagascar – Country Profile).
With regards to compliance and enforcement mechanisms of ABS laws and
benefit-sharing arrangements, the Protocol’s system is highly complex, with
implications that will be discussed later. The three cornerstones are
1.
2.
3.

Article 15 (compliance with domestic legislation or regulatory
requirements on ABS);
Article 18 (compliance with MAT); and
Article 17 (monitoring the utilisation of genetic resources).
19

The system is based on “a mix of international and domestic measures,
including: basic obligations on users to respect national access laws, supportive
monitoring measures, including through designated ‘checkpoints,’ the issuing of
internationally recognised certificates of compliance as evidence of legal acquisition
in provider countries, and the future establishment of an international mechanism
to address the compliance of Parties with their Protocol obligations in a cooperative
and non-adversarial manner (Duriasamy, A., 2011).

Source: Glowka, L., & Normand, V. (2013). The Nagoya Protocol
on Access and Benefit-Sharing: Innovations in International
Environmental Law
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Trans-sectorial and International Legal Implications of the Nagoya Protocol
The Nagoya Protocol deals with resources that span across several different
ecosystems. Furthermore, companies, organisations, and individuals use the
resources to achieve a wide range of goals. The Nagoya protocol is now on par with
internationally legally binding documents from various other organisations
including the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It is important to note
how the Nagoya Protocol fits into, and challenges, existing cross-sectorial legal
frameworks (McGraw, D., 2002).
With regards to environmental protection, the Nagoya Protocol has the
potential to reshape how we approach conservation and protection. The Protocol
strikes a balance between the economic and non-economic values of biodiversity. As
Beck et al. notes, articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol “tightly [link] access and benefit
sharing with the first and second objectives of the CBD – conservation and
sustainable use.” Even the benefits outlined in the appendix are geared towards
rewarding those who successfully conserve biodiversity. Several of the concepts
regarding the crossroads of development and the environment are reflected in the
UN Sustainable Development Goals, which replaced the Millennium Development
Goals in 2015.
The Nagoya Protocol adds another dimension to how parties approach
international human rights law. A heavy historical influence of colonialism has
resulted in the marginalisation of indigenous people. Despite the presence of
international human rights law aimed towards preventing such marginalisation, the
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treatment of indigenous people falls under the jurisdiction of regional and national
law. So, the societal marginalisation many indigenous people face is more often than
not reflected in discriminatory legal practices (Savaresi, A., 2013).
The Nagoya Protocols’ ABS provisions are ground breaking in that it is the
first time “that such obligations are triggered by the use of traditional knowledge for
research and development purposes in an international legally binding instrument.
(Tsioumani, E., 2015)” Traditional knowledge, and by extension the possessors of
that knowledge, is protected under international law.
Furthermore, the Nagoya Protocol aims towards legal empowerment of
Indigenous and Local Communities (ILCs) through the creation of a compliance
committee. The committee is consists of 15 regional representatives. “In addition,
two ILC representatives nominated directly by ILCs, and with at least one from a
developing country, shall serve as observers and participate in the deliberations of
the committee, albeit not in decision-making. (Tsioumani, E., 2015)” Despite falling
short of awarding ILCs full voting rights, their presence in the committee is an
indispensible legal outlet for them to voice concerns and share opinions regarding
cases that directly affect them (Savaresi, A., 2013).
Further implications for human rights identified by Savaresi include issues of
information accessibility (which is enhanced with the ABS Clearing-House), and the
participatory decision making process and justice accessibility of the compliance
committee (Savaresi, A., 2013).
During negotiations, developed countries and the WHO were highly
concerned about their ability to access pathogens in the case of emergencies or
22

pandemics. They worried that stricter legislation would make their ability to
respond and create vaccines in a timely manner would be hindered. Developing
countries worried that emergencies would be used as a pretext for expedited access,
and they would not receive adequate benefits – particularly affordable vaccine
access. Negotiations on these issues brought up in Nagoya played a large role in the
creation of the 2011 WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for the
Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and other Benefits (Glowka, L.,
2013).
Finally, the CBD and Nagoya Protocol had several implications for the World
Trade Organisation, World Intellectual Property Organisation, and Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. TRIPS, ratified in 1995,
set a minimum global standard for the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights and patents. It makes no reference to traditional knowledge because
unlike the CBD, it does not consider customary ownership a form of intellectual
property because, “without patent protection, ownership does not exist.”
Furthermore, TRIPS requires each country to set their own patent systems. These
systems are unenforceable outside their patent domain – a sui generis system (WTO
Report, 2006).
As of now, there are still unresolved issues. For example, a coalition of
governments charged that pharmaceutical companies must state where they source
their genetic material in order to receive a patent. This amendment has not been
made, especially because several members of TRIPS feel that increased regulatory
measures in TRIPS will result in a decreased autonomy for countries to implement
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their own standards. As such, it has been difficult to reconcile conflict areas between
the CBD and TRIPS (WTO Report, 2006).
Implementation: Process and Challenges
While it is one thing to ratify a treaty and agree upon its principles, it is another
thing entirely to put those principles into practice. As Tsioumani puts it;
“Implementation is thus expected to entail a dynamic web
of legal relationships: administrative decisions on access are
set out in domestic permits, linking to contractual benefitsharing agreements between private parties and backed by the
establishment of benefit-sharing arrangements to be
supported by an enabling framework of national laws in
provider and user countries.”
Interviews with Liva Ramiandrarivo and Naritiana Rakotoniaina, the
National Focal Points for Madagascar, outlined some of the foreseeable
implementation challenges. These include financing, capacity building,
political/governmental blocks, and institutional arrangements.
One of the major problems Madagascar faces stems from a lack of – and
limited access to – funding. The 2009 political crisis resulted in the withdrawal of
several investors, who worried that the unstable political climate made the risk of
investment too high. Though Madagascar’s government has stabilised, it has never
regained its investor base (Ramiandrarivo Interview, 17/11/2015).
Now, Madagascar has drafted its National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan
(NBSAP), yet without a source of funding, it is difficult to implement.
Ramiandrarivo’s work with the ministry has seen similar issues. He and his team
have established 123 new protected areas in Madagascar. While the government is
willing to provide funding for the Ministry of Forestry, they are incapable due to
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budgetary constraints to provide funds for the management of those areas. Now,
Madagascar is in the process of preparing its proposal to submit at the buyer
conference in 2016 (Ramiandrarivo Interview, 17/11/2015).
The lack of funding has resulted in challenges in capacity building. One
example is the Ministry of Forestry’s inability to determine the economic value of
biodiversity in Madagascar. As Ramiandrarivo pointed out, “it is important for us to
know the economic value of our biodiversity because it enables us to better defend
our position in negotiations against those who wish to degrade it. (Ramiandrarivo
Interview, 17/11/2015)”
In recent negotiations between the Ministry of Forestry and the mining
sector, and with petitions going to the government for sub-marine petrol
exploration, the ministry found it difficult to defend their position and advance their
cause. Both the mining and petrol sectors had monetary gains they could point to as
beneficial to the Malagasy economy. But without knowing the economic value of
biodiversity in Madagascar, conservation and aims to push implementation of the
CBD remained far too abstract for concrete action (Ramiandrarivo Interview,
17/11/2015).
Naritiana Rakotoniaina faced similar challenges with the Malagasy
government in trying to implement the Nagoya Protocol. In 2011, SAGE submitted a
political letter outlining the national approach to implementation, yet due to
political instability, it was a low priority. Furthermore, it would have taken over two
years to elaborate the legal framework and create an official ABS law by the time the
law made it through the bureaucratic steps. So, efforts are now being focused on
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transitory measures based on existing research authorisation processes
(Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). The Ministry responsible for the environment
is also working with the GIZ-led multi-donor ABS Capacity Development Initiative to
further their goals (Robinson, D., 2014).
Furthermore, internal discussions regarding the institutional arrangement
necessary for the implementation of an ABS law have been fraught. Bioprospecting’s
nature as a cross-sectorial issue requires the coordination of various government
offices, ranging from the ministry of fisheries, to agriculture, to marine. Madagascar
has yet to nominate a competent national authority because the question remains
who or what ministry will host the authority (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15).
Should there be the creation of a new bureau designated specifically for
issues regarding access, benefit sharing, and research rights? Or should it be a
committee comprised of representatives from affected ministries? Both set ups have
their pros and cons that need to be examined. The creation of an entirely new
bureau comes with issues of its potential functionality and fairness dealing with a
very sensitive topic. Furthermore, the creation of a new bureau would require funds
the Malagasy government does not have the ability to provide. Yet the creation of a
committee raises issues of its ability to make timely decisions, as existing ministries
are hesitant to give up their autonomy in general resource management. Either way,
the absence of a strong central government makes both options difficult to manage
(Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15).
Finally, since Madagascar already has several bioprospecting ventures under
way, existing projects must be taken into account. It is not possible to retroactively
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apply laws, and so the draft legislation must attempt to tackle value chain
management in order to effectively ensure benefit sharing without retroactive
application of new legislation (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15).

NON-GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS
Due to the absence of a national framework, trends among corporations seeking
to utilise domestic resources in Madagascar often depend on contractual
agreements. One such example of this, and widely considered a success story, is that
of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG) Madagascar.

International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups - Madagascar
The ICBG is a consortium of American government research institutions,
pharmaceutical companies, and international conservation organisations founded in
1992. It was founded to “integrate improvement of human health through drug
discovery, creation of incentives for conservation of biodiversity, and promotion of
scientific research and sustainable economic activity that focuses on environment,
health, equity, and democracy. (Rosenthal, 1998)”
The ICBG was conceived as a way to combine the diverse interests of various
parties under the shared mission of environmental conservation. The belief was that
the promotion of scientific capacity building and economic incentives would lead to
a market based conservation mechanism designed to protect the biological
resources from which commercial products are derived (ICBG).
Yet despite its commercial motivations, and the fact that the U.S. never
ratified the CBD or Nagoya protocol, the ICBG’s mission ensures that it closely
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adopts the access and benefit sharing provisions of both the CBD and Nagoya
protocol. As Mr Michel Ratsimbason, Director of the Centre National d’Application
des Recherches Pharmaceutiques, states, “even though the U.S. never ratified the
CBD, it is clear that they uphold the spirit of the Nagoya protocol.” (Ratsimbason
Interview, 11/11/15)
Dr David Kingston, of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, heads ICBG’s Madagascar
chapter. The chapter was founded in 1998 and went through three successive fiveyear funding cycles, from 1998 – 2003, 2003 – 2008, and 2008 – 2013. Funding
comes from the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation,
and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDOA) (Rosenthal, J. 1998). These three
institutions are partnered with the following members of the Madagascar
consortium:


Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg,
Virginia – The university that Dr David Kingston is based, and the site
most research on extracts and ex situ conservation are done at;



Centre National d’Application des Recherches Pharmaceutiques
(CNARP) – CNARP is a public Malagasy research institution partially
funded by the state. Their goal is to reinforce and valorise the
traditional medicine system of Madagascar, and does both research
and synthesis of pharmaceutical products (Ratsimbason Interview,
11/11/2015);



Centre National de Recherches sur l’Environnement (CNRE);



Centre National des Recherches Océanographiques (CNRO);
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Missouri Botanical Gardens (MBG) – MBG is an American Botanical
society with a presence in Madagascar. Their objectives are mostly
botanical research, species identification, and the establishment of a
national plant database, though they have recently gotten more
involved with community based conservation efforts (Birkinshaw
Interview, 23/11/2015);



Conservation International (CI);



Eisai Pharmaceutical Research Institution; and



Dow Agrosciences (DAS).

Managing to get such diverse organisations to agree and cooperate was no
easy feat, and was accomplished through an “all-party Research Agreement.” Since
the funding agencies (NIH, USDOA, and NSF) are not parties to the research, “they
are prohibited by U.S. Federal law from stipulating specific contractual terms.”
(Rosenthal) Rather, they encourage parties to develop agreements that abide by the
general framework of principles:
1. Active participation of host country individuals and
organisations from the planning stage onward,
2. Multi-disciplinary research on diseases of both local
and international significance,
3. Local training and infrastructure development in
both drug discovery and biodiversity management,
4. Biodiversity inventory and monitoring, and
5. Equitable intellectual property and benefit-sharing
arrangements. (Rosenthal)
The contract, written by a lawyer from Conservation International
(Robinson, 51, 2014), is confidential, as most private sector commercial agreements
are. The ICBG rejected Madagascar’s offer of support in drafting the contract, opting
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instead to use CI’s lawyer (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15). This is important to
note, as it makes the transparency that could potentially be achieved through
governmental contracts and the ABS clearing-house mechanism non-existent. The
implications of this lack of transparency could result in abuse of contracts, and
limited compliance enforcing capabilities.
According to Rakotoniaina, the contract was signed in the U.S., and
Madagascar’s government was simply notified it was signed, and they never
received a copy of the document (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/15).
Furthermore, the confidential nature of the document makes it difficult for
the general public – including directly and indirectly affected indigenous and local
community members – to know what lies within their rights, and what parties to the
agreement are obligated to do. This makes it difficult to protect against potential
human rights abuses.
Nevertheless, discussions with members of the ICBG provide insights as to
agreements within the Research Agreement. Agreements cover a range of topics,
such as access regarding use and type of genetic resources, intellectual property
rights and confidentiality, use of traditional knowledge, prior informed consent, and
compensation and royalties.
Access and Use
The types of genetic resources accessible include plants (whose use and
documentation is monitored by Michel Ratsimbason at CNARP and MBG), marine
life (monitored by CNRO), and microbial extracts (monitored by Rado
Rasolomampianina at CNER). Extracts include both biochemical compounds and
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DNA. Resources are to be used for scientific and potential commercial purposes.
Finally, sectorial use is limited to the agriculture industry for pesticides, herbicides,
and crop protections through DAS, and pharmaceutical use through Eisai and
previously, Bristol-Myers Squibb (Robinson, D., 2014).
As MBG botanist Chris Birkinshaw emphasised, no live organic matter was
removed from Madagascar despite requests and petitions to the Malagasy
government (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/12015).
No ethnobotanical knowledge was used during the surveying and collection
of plants. Whilst in the field with local guides, even if local knowledge regarding
plant uses was volunteered, MBG researchers were instructed to not record it. All
field journals were made public, verifying that no record was taken of traditional
knowledge received (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/12015).
Prior informed consent (PIC) was “given at the national level by the
Government through the Ministry in charge of Scientific research (who signed the
contract), at the regional level by the “Chef de région,” and at the local level by local
authorities (mainly mayors) and by the local communities (pers. corr. Christian
Camara, 27/11/2015).” With the local communities, representatives of the ICBG
project would explain the project and implications to the committee of villagers.
They would explain the benefit sharing that would result from consent, and the
community members would make a decision (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
Though “there was no real legal obligation in Madagascar for the project to
[obtain PIC], the consortium agreed from the start that ICBG would comply with
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international standards. The CBD was used as reference (pers. corr. Camara,
27/11/2015).”
Yet as Chris Birkinshaw noted, throughout the process it was unclear
whether or not villagers entirely understood the implications of the ICBG program,
or whether they simply agreed in order to receive the benefits. As he put it, “telling a
group of villagers that they would receive thousands of dollars to build schools,
bridges, and wells in exchange for a tea spoon of soil from their forest seems
preposterous.” (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015)
This dilemma outlines the importance of Article 21 of the Nagoya Protocol.
Article 21 seeks to raise awareness about ABS and the Nagoya Protocol, with the
hope that with this knowledge communities will be better informed to make
educated decisions regarding their resources.
Though authorities and community members granted consent, it was granted
in the absence of participation from a competent national authority accountable to
the Nagoya Protocol standards. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the
consent granted complied with protocol that determines what constitutes prior
informed consent, even if it fully complies with the terms outlined in the all party
Research Agreement.
Although “PIC was given every time the project intervention site was
changed, (pers. corr. Camara, 27/11/2015)” changing environmental, economic, and
social landscapes have the potential to make the context consent was given
irrelevant – yet another slippery slope.
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Subsequent to obtaining PIC, access was granted and use was limited to
members of the ICBG consortium. Restrictions were placed on third party transfers
in order to maximise potential benefit to consortium members Dow and Eisai. What
remains unclear, however, is “if third party transfers might occurs at a later date in
the future, and what terms the contract has relating to this. (Robinson, D. 49, 2014)”
For Naritiana Rakotoniaina, the ambiguity surrounding third party use
provides a problem for the Malagasy governments’ enforcement of the Nagoya
Protocol. Now that the project has concluded, there is no way for the Malagasy
government to monitor samples that have been sent out of the country for ex-situ
conservation or research (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/2015).
The ICBG counters that working through CNARP checks this threat. CNARP
would collect, identify, and dry out the plants, and send them to U.S. research
institutions with a code system. The code system prevented the U.S. researchers
from knowing exactly what species the plant was and where it was obtained.
Without this information, access to biomass becomes much more difficult
(Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
Benefit Sharing
Perhaps the most obvious and immediate benefit received from the ICBG
came from the Compensation Fund. The fund was paid for by Eisai and Dow, and
was a way to provide compensation for the collection and use of genetic resources
regardless of what came out of the research. This is especially important, since the
development process often takes 5 – 15 years (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
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50% of the fund went directly to local communities, and manifested itself in
development and conservation projects. Schools, bridges, wells, and the like were
built. Conservation projects included community forests and agricultural ventures.
In the first phase of the project, Zahamena was the only community working with
the ICBG and had access to all 50% of the compensation fund. Yet as the project
grew and worked with more communities, the fund was divided among
communities they worked with (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
The other 50% of the compensation fund was directed to the national
government and Malagasy research institutions working with ICBG (CNARP, CNRE,
and CNRO). For Mr Ratsimbason and his team at CNARP, the compensation fund was
an invaluable tool in setting up CNARP’s malaria lab. Malaria runs rampant among
the Malagasy population, and CNARP has managed to dedicate significant amounts
of time and energy to researching malaria. This would not have been possible
without the assistance of equipment purchased through the compensation fund. Mr
Ratsimbason believes that without the ICBG, combatting malaria would not be at the
level it is today in Madagascar. Furthermore, the ICBG paid for several of CNARP’s
researchers to be sent for training at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, with all expenses
paid (Ratsimbason Interview, 11/11/2015).
Another example of the benefits the compensation fund has provided
Madagascar is with CNRE. CNRE was able to obtain very expensive soil analysis
equipment through the compensation fund, and possession of that equipment has
since enabled them to win a lucrative contract with a mining company (Birkinshaw
Interview, 23/11/2015).
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Yet officials in the Malagasy government are unhappy with the compensation
fund, believing it to be insufficient in comparison to the potential profits and scale of
use of resources. Had a national framework been in place, negotiations to set a
number the Malagasy government agreed with would have been much more
productive (Rakotoniaina Interview, 24/11/2015).
Apart from the initial compensation fund, the ICBG set up milestone
payments (to be paid at key development intervals), and royalties (percentage
shares of profits received once a drug is developed and reaches the market)
(Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
As of now, no drugs have been developed, so milestone and royalty payments
are inactive. This is verified by MBG, who says that they would know if a plant
contained compounds of interest because the orders of biomass would go
significantly up to supply the increase in research activity, and MBG and CNARP
would notice (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
Another check to ensure Madagascar is not being cheated is also a part of the
non-monetary benefits scheme – information sharing. Each year, Dr David Kingston
is required to publish the findings and research of the ICBG’s efforts. This serves two
purposes; firstly, publication renders the information public and thus not
patentable, since the information is no longer new or novel. This in turn protects
Madagascar against biopiracy cases, and is further protected with the coding system
discussed previously (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
Secondly, the information sharing system provides Madagascar the option to
pursue research of interest in Madagascar even though it may not be in the U.S.
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Access to and permission to use that information saves considerable time and effort
on Madagascar’s end (Birkinshaw Interview, 23/11/2015).
While not without its flaws, the general consensus has been that ICBG
Madagascar has been one of the more successful ICBG projects in the world. It is
important to take into account the potential success of non-governmental
contractual agreements when developing a national framework for implementation
of the Nagoya protocol, in order to ensure flexibility among partnerships, and that
international standards are upheld.

CONCLUSION
As Madagascar continues its laudable work at developing ABS frameworks,
there remain several factors to be taken into account. The first factor is the several
legal grey areas that exist. For example, are genetic resources found on private
property government property? Who is responsible for the ultimate authorisation –
landowner or government?
Secondly, Madagascar must continue to look forward in light of the recent
Sustainable Development Goals and the 2020 Aichi Biodiversity Targets and attempt
to work ABS provisions in with the broader goal of environmental conservation.
Work must continue to tackle the hurdles blocking a successful
implementation of Nagoya. Suggested research should include continued surveys of
implementation stages, research on the feasibility of various institutional
arrangements, methods for capacity building, and enhancing cross-sectorial
communication and coordination. The Nagoya Protocol has the potential to be
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incredibly beneficial for all parties involved. Yet for it to work, Madagascar must do
all it can to promote its effective implementation in the coming years.

APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: Suggested Elements for Material Transfer Agreements
Material transfer agreements may contain wording on the following elements:
A. Introductory provisions
1. Preambular reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity
2. Legal status of the provider and user of genetic resources
3. Mandate and/or general objectives of provider and, where appropriate, user of
genetic resources
B. Access and benefit-sharing provisions
1. Description of genetic resources covered by the material transfer agreements,
including accompanying information
2. Permitted uses, bearing in mind the potential uses, of the genetic resources,
their products or derivatives under the material transfer agreement (e.g.
research, breeding, commercialization)
3. Statement that any change of use would require new prior informed consent
and material transfer agreement
4. Whether intellectual property rights may be sought and if so under what
conditions
5. Terms of benefit-sharing arrangements, including commitment to share
monetary and non-monetary benefits
6. No warranties guaranteed by provider on identity and/or quality of the
provided material
7. Whether the genetic resources and/or accompanying information may be
transferred to third parties and if so conditions that should apply
8. Definitions
9. Duty to minimize environmental impacts of collecting activities
C. Legal provisions
1. Obligation to comply with the material transfer agreement
2. Duration of agreement
3. Notice to terminate the agreement
4. Fact that the obligations in certain clauses survive the termination of the
agreement
5. Independent enforceability of individual clauses in the agreement
6. Events limiting the liability of either party (such as act of God, fire, flood, etc.)
7. Dispute settlement arrangements
8. Assignment or transfer of rights
9. Assignment, transfer or exclusion of the right to claim any property rights,
including intellectual property rights, over the genetic resources received
through the material transfer agreement
10. Choice of law
11. Confidentiality clause
12. Guarantee
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APPENDIX B: Monetary and Non-Monetary Benefits

1. Monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:
a. Access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired;
b. Up-front payments;
c. Milestone payments;
d. Payment of royalties;
e. License fees in case of commercialization;
f. Special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable
use of biodiversity;
g. Salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed;
h. Research funding;
i. Joint ventures;
j. Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.
2. Non-monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:
a. Sharing of research and development results;
b. Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research and
development programmes, particularly biotechnological research activities,
where possible in the provider country;
c. Participation in product development;
d. Cooperation and contribution in education and training;
e. Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases;
f. Transfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and technology
under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and
preferential terms where agreed, in particular, knowledge and technology that
make use of genetic resources, including biotechnology, or that are relevant to
the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological diversity;
g. Strengthening capacities for technology transfer to user developing country
Parties and to Parties that are countries with economies in transition and
technology development in the country of origin that provides genetic
resources. Also to facilitate abilities of indigenous and local communities to
conserve and sustainably use their genetic resources;
h. Institutional capacity-building;
i. Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the
administration and enforcement of access regulations.
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ISP REVIEW SHEET
1. Your topic - suitability, development, accessibility
My topic was very interesting, and accessible. However with the limited time period it
was hard to set up as many interviews as I’d have liked. It involved a lot of waiting for
people to reply to me. Taxiing around the city was efficient but expensive.
2. Location of field study - where you conducted your field study, who helped set it
up (who was helpful and who was not; include names, addresses, and phone
numbers if possible), strengths and weaknesses of the site
I conducted my study in Antananarivo, mostly in the offices of people I was
interviewing. Joel, the pharmacology student assisting me was very useful in helping
me get around. My advisor, Voahangy, provided a wonderful starting point for people I
could interview.
3. Nuts and bolts - where to get water & food, costs, where to stay, medical
resources, other problems
I stayed with Patricia’s parents in Ivandry. Very useful, they provided me with delicious
food and beverages.
4. Other noteworthy comments

List your secondary sources and contacts, where they were found, and which were
most helpful here:-
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